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Extending The Liability of Insurers
for Bad Faith Acts:
Royal Globe Insurance Company
v. Superior Court
Breaking through previously erected theoretical barriers, the California
Supreme Court has held that the Unfair Practices Act imposes a duty upon
insurers, to act fairly and in good faith in their negotiations with third
party claimants. The implications of such a decision promise to be far.
reaching, and subsequent decisions will undoubtedly clarify the issue. An
analysis of the decision and its ramifications is herein presented.
INTRODUCTION
The California Supreme Court decision in Royal Globe v. Supe-
rior Court' establishes that third party claimants, as well as in-
sured claimants, have a right to sue insurers for violations of the
Unfair Practices Act.2 The decision also establishes that a claim-
1. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
2. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1976). All references, unless otherwise stated,
will be to CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(h) (West 1976) which provides:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and
unfair and deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance:
(h) Knowingly committing or performing with such frequency as to indi-
cate a general business practice any of the following unfair claims settle-
ment practices:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts of insurance policy pro-
visions relating to any coverage at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communi-
cations with respect to claims arising out of insurance policies.
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt
investigation and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after proof of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by
the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due
under an insurance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts
ultimately recovered in actions brought by such insureds, when such in-
sureds have made claims for amounts reasonably similar to the amounts
ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount
to which a reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by refer-
ence to written or printed advertising material accompanying or made
part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was
ant may base an action against an insurer on a single instance of
unfair conduct specified in the statute. The decision re-estab-
lishes that a plaintiff may not bring an action against the insured
and the insurer in the same lawsuit.3
The plaintiff in Royal Globe was the victim of a slip and fall ac-
cident at a food market. She filed a personal injury action as a re-
sult of the injuries she sustained. The complaint joined the food
market with its insurer, Royal Globe Insurance Company. The
plaintiff alleged that the insurer had violated California Insurance
Code Section 790.03 (h) (5) because it had refused to attempt, in
good faith, a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement even though
liability had become reasonably clear.4 Furthermore, the com-
plaint charged Royal Globe with a violation of California Insur-
ance Code section 790.03 (h) (14), alleging that its independent
adjuster had advised the plaintiff not to obtain the services of an
attorney. 5 Royal Globe demurred to the complaint and made a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings asserting three arguments.
First, the California Insurance Commissioner has exclusive power
to enforce the Unfair Practices Act. Second, a third party does
not have standing to bring an action under the act. Finally, the
plaintiff may not sue the insured and the insurer in the same ac-
tion. The trial court overruled the demurrer and denied the mo-
tion. The California Supreme Court chose to review the case on
the defendant's writ of mandate to reverse.
altered without notice to or knowledge or consent of the insured, his rep-
resentative, agent, or broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries,
upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment was made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of
appealing from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the
purpose of compelling them to accept settlements or compromises less
than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims an insured, claim-
ant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report and
then requiring the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms,
both of which submissions contain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become appar-
ent, under one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influ-
ence settlements under other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis re-
lied on in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law,
for the denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attor-
ney.
(15) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
3. See notes 61-65 and accompanying text infra.
4. Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 845.
5. Id.
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I. A BASIC ILLUSTRATION
In order to better appreciate the impact of the Royal Globe de-
cision, it is necessary to examine the nature of the duty of good
faith owed by insurers.6 The following hypothetical situation will
establish the framework for this discussion: A, a pedestrian, is le-
gally crossing the street; B illegally drives through a red light and
strikes A, injuring him. A files an action for personal injuries
against B. B's liability insurer, C, assumes the defense on behalf
of B. B's insurance policy limit is $20,000. After discovery proce-
dures have been substantially completed, it becomes clear that B
is liable for A's injuries because of his negligent driving. A is
willing to settle the claim for $12,000, but C refuses the settlement
offer, even though it is well within the policy coverage. The case
subsequently goes to trial and A receives a judgment award of
$30,000. C pays the $20,000 due on the policy, leaving B liable for
the $10,000 balance. B does not pay this to A, resulting in an un-
satisfied judgment.
This hypothetical is illustrative of a typical bad faith settlement
by an insurer.7 A breach of a covenant of good faith results from
C's refusal to accept the settlement offer within the policy limit,
even though the likelihood of a judgment award for an amount
greater than that limit was very real.8 In this situation, B would
have a claim against C for the bad faith action. He may act on
this right in one of two ways. The first option would be for B to
pay A the $10,000, and then sue C for reimbursement. The allega-
tion being that C's refusal to settle within the policy limits
damaged B.9 Under the second option, B would assign to A the
6. It has been well established in California law that an insurer owes a duty
of good faith and fair dealing to insureds. See, e.g., Johansen v. California State
Auto Ass'n., 15 Cal. 3d 9, 538 P.2d 744, 123 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1975); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders and
General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
7. See, e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1976).
8. See note 6 supra.
9. See Johansen v. California State Auto Ass'n., 15 Cal. 3d at 17, 538 P.2d at
749, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (quoting crom Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d at 431,
426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17):
The size of the judgment recovered in the personal injury action when it
exceeds the policy limits, although not conclusive, furnishes an inference
that the value of the claim is the equivalent of the amount of the judgment
and that acceptance of an offer within those limits was the most reason-
able method of dealing with the claim.
right to sue C for the breach of the good faith duty.10 Prior to
Royal Globe the duty of good faith was due exclusively to the in-
sured." A third party claimant such as A had no right to sue an
insurer for bad faith actions because the duty of good faith did
not flow to such a claimant.
II. PRIOR CASES DEALING WITH THE THIRD PARTY QUESTION
Austero v. National Casualty Co. 12 and Murphy v. Allstate In-
surance Co. 13 typify the handling of the third party issue by Cali-
fornia courts prior to the Royal Globe decision. In Austero, the
defendant insurer refused to deliver the benefits owed to the in-
sured under a disability policy. The insured's wife filed an action
against the insurer for a bad faith delay in paying the benefits. In
dismissing the claim, the court said: "an insurer's duty of good
faith and fair dealing is owed solely to its insured, and, perhaps
an express beneficiary of the insurance policy."' 4
This holding may, however, be limited to the particular fact sit-
uation in Austero. There, the wife was not a victim of a separate
tort by the insured, as is found in the customary bad faith illustra-
tion, as previously described. Furthermore, she was not injured
by the insurer's refusal to deal in good faith, since the benefits of
the policy were owed not to her, but rather to the policyholder,
her husband. Thus, it may be argued that Austero merely reflects
the position that a non-victim third party has no right to sue for
the bad faith indiscretions of insurers. Although the scope of the
Austero decision is limited, the underlying denial of third party
rights remains significant.
In Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co., the court addressed a fact
situation similar to that found in the Royal Globe case. In Mur-
phy, the plaintiff sued the insured for the wrongful death of her
nine-year-old son. The liability insurer rejected settlement de-
mands of $23,500 and $25,000, even though the policy limit of
$25,000 was not exceeded. The case subsequently went to trial
and the plaintiff was awarded a judgment of $42,000. The insurer
then paid the $25,000 due on the policy. The plaintiff subse-
quently sued the insurer for the outstanding $17,000, without hav-
ing the claim assigned to her by the insured. The basis of this
suit was that the insurer had acted in bad faith during settlement
negotiations. The plaintiff cited the Financial Responsibility
10. E.g., Murphy v. Allstate, 17 Cal. 3d at 937, 553 P.2d at 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
424 (1976).
11. Id.
12. 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 133 Cal. Rptr. 107 (1976).
13. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
14. 62 Cal. App. 3d at 517, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 110.
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Law' 5 which provides that victims are third party beneficiaries of
the insurance contract. The duty to deal in good faith was owed
not only to the insured, but to the plaintiff as an injured third
party beneficiary.16
Although the Murphy court confirmed that there is an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract,17 it re-
jected the contention that a third party beneficiary analysis af-
fords a third party a right to sue for a violation of the duty:
The insurers' duty to settle does not directly benefit the injured claimant.
In fact he usually benefits from the duty's breach. Instead of receiving an
award near policy limits, he stands to obtain judgment exceeding policy
coverage. For instance, in the present case, plaintiff has already received
an amount equal to her highest settlement demand, and is holding an un-
satisfied judgment for an additional $17,000.18
The apparent "benefit" occasioned by an insurer's breach is
somewhat misleading, since it may be argued that the Murphy
court's analysis only involves a discussion of the primary tort
wherein the third party was in some way victimized by the in-
sured. The court, in effect, is stating that the third party plaintiff
stands to receive an award exceeding her settlement wishes.
However, this view neglects to consider the additional injury in-
curred by a third party who is the victim of a bad faith practice.
This injury is the result of a separate and distinct bad faith action
on the part of the insurer. Accordingly, a third party plaintiff will
not receive a larger judgment award on the primary tort, but
rather, compensation for a violation of the duty of good faith owed
by insurers to third parties.
Inasmuch as the Murphy court does not directly address the
second injury, the question of a separate duty owed directly to a
third party for such an injury is left unanswered. The holding of
Murphy may be limited to the principle that a third party has no
15. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580 (West 1972), provides in part:
(b) Such policy shall not be thus issued ... unless it contains all the
following provisions...
(2) A provision that whenever judgment is secured against the insured
or the executor or administrator of a deceased insured in an action
based upon bodily injury, death, or property damage, then an action
may be brought against the insurer on the policy and subject to its
terms and limitations, by such judgment creditor to recover on the
judgment.
16. See notes 19-31 and accompanying text infra.
17. See note 7 supra, at 940, 553 P.2d at 556, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (1976) (quot-
ing from Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 883 (1949)).
18. Id. at 941, 553 P.2d at 557, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (1976).
right to sue an insurer for the breach of a duty which flows only
between the insurer and the insured.
III. A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY APPROACH TO THE EXTENSION
OF AN INSURER'S DuTY OF GOOD FAITH
The plaintiff in Murphy attempted to gain standing to sue the
insurer by arguing for a third party beneficiary right.19 Many ar-
guments made by third parties 20 have been similarly based on
this assertion, which argues that a third party is the intended
beneficiary of a contract between an insurer and the insured.2 1
The reasoning being good faith is implied in the contract, there-
fore, third parties should be permitted to sue for a breach of the
duty.22
In Zahn v. Canadian Indemnity Co.,23 the plaintiff and his wife
were injured by the insured. The plaintiff insisted the liability in-
surer settle his claim separately from that of his wife. When the
insurer refused, the Zahns sued the insurer for acting in bad faith
during the settlement conferences. Like the plaintiff in Murphy,24
the Zahns contended that the Financial Responsibility Law 25
made them third party beneficiaries to the contract. The court in
Zahn, by implication, agreed that a victim is a third party benefi-
ciary, but only for purposes of the primary claim brought against
the insured. The court stated, "[W]hatever rights may inure to
the injured party as a third party beneficiary of a contract of lia-
bility insurance, they do not include any right to require the in-
surer to negotiate or settle with him prior to the establishment of
the insured's liability."26
The Zahn holding was consistent with the general rule in Cali-
fornia that third parties may sue the insurer for an unpaid judg-
ment within the policy limits, but that no such right exists for a
second injury caused by the insurer's bad faith refusal to settle
19. Id.
20. See notes 21-28 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958):
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held
liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the
balancing of various factors, among which are the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the forseeability of harm to
him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness
of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered
22. Contra, Zahn v. Canadian Indemnity Co., 57 Cal. App. 3d 509, 514, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 286, 291 (1976).
23. Id. at 509, 129 Cal. Rptr. 286.
24. Murphy v. Allstate, at 943, 553 P.2d at 589, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (1976).
25. See note 15 supra.
26. See note 22 supra at 514, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 291 (1976).
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the claim.27 Thus, the courts have determined the insurance con-
tract is divisible for third party beneficiary purposes. On the one
hand there are the rights and duties stemming from the primary
tort of the insured, and on the other, there are different rights and
duties which relate to the bad faith act of the insurer. It can be
seen, therefore, that the third party is a beneficiary only insofar
as the contract relates to the tortious conduct of the insured.28
In order for a third party to convince a court that he should
have a right to sue for the bad faith actions of an insurer, it must
first be shown that the third party is a beneficiary for purposes of
the entire contract, and not merely for that part which protects
him from the tortious conduct of the insured. In other words, a
third party must prove that a breach of the duty of good faith is as
detrimental to a third party as is the original injury suffered at
the hands of the insured. Based on the Murphy and Zahn deci-
sions, however, it is highly unlikely that a plaintiff would be suc-
cessful with such an argument since the court in those cases
refused to find a third party beneficiary status under the Finan-
cial Responsibility Law. Moreover, there is no indication that
such an interpretation would have been found under the Unfair
Practices Act.29 Thus, had the Royal Globe plaintiff argued the
third party beneficiary analysis, she would have met with the
same results30 as did the third party claimants in Murphy and
Zahn.
Fortunately for the plaintiff in Royal Globe, the court found no
need to develop a third party beneficiary analysis. Rather, it in-
terpreted the Unfair Practices Act in a manner which identified a
separate and distinct duty of good faith owed directly to the third
27. See, e.g., Johnson v. Holmes Tuttle Lincoln Mercury, 160 Cal. App. 2d 290,
297, 325 P.2d 193, 197 (1958).
28. Austero v. National Casualty Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516-17, 133 Cal. Rptr.
107, 110 (1976):
Whether for better or worse, the historical development of a tort is an im-
portant factor in determining its scope. . ., thus far, liability for 'bad faith'
has been strictly tied to the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing arising out of an underlying contractual relationship. Where no
such relationship exists, no recovery for 'bad faith' may be had.
29. See note 2 supra.
30. In other words, the Royal Globe court would have had to hold that since
the Unfair Practices Act afforded private litigants a cause of action (See notes 51-
57 and accompanying text infra.), third parties, being private litigants, inure to the
benefits of the act as incorporated into the insurance contract. Such a holding
would have acted to overrule the decisions in Zahn and Murphy.
party claimant. 31
IV. ANALYSIS OF ROYAL GLOBE V. SUPERIOR COURT
1. The Rights of Third Parties
The keystone of the Royal Globe decision is that the insurer
owes a duty of good faith directly to the third party claimant. The
court arrived at this conclusion by examining the language3 2 of
Section 790.03 of the California Insurance Code and interpreting it
so as to provide a cause of action for third parties victimized by a
bad faith act.33 For example, Code Section 790.03(h) (15),34 which
prohibits misleading a claimant regarding the applicable statute
of limitations, and Section 790.03 (h) (14),35 which prohibits advis-
ing a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney, each con-
tain language which explicitly refers to duties owed to
claimants.36 The court concluded that since the Unfair Practices
Act refers to claimants, the insurer owes a direct duty of good
faith to third party claimants as well as to insured claimants.37 In
further supporting its decision, the court cited the legislative his-
tory of the act as another indication that the Legislature intended
it to protect third parties. The court pointed out that in 1972,
before the bill's enactment, a representative of the Department of
Insurance testified before committees that the act "could be con-
strued to affect third parties." 38 Additionally, the Department of
Insurance sent a "Bill Analysis" to the Assembly arguing the act
needed clarification inasmuch as it appeared to apply to third par-
31. Royal Globe v. Superior Court 23 Cal. 3d 880, 890, 592 P.2d 329, 335, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 842, 848 (1979).
32. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847. See also CAL. INS. CODE
§ 790.03 (h) (5).
35. Id.
36. The court stated:
Of the two subdivisions on which plaintiffs action is based, one refers spe-
cifically to a claimant, i.e., subdivision (h) (14), which prohibits 'advising a
claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney, and the other appears
to cover both claimants and insureds in providing that it is an unfair prac-
tice to fail to attempt 'in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equita-
ble settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.'
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
847.
37. The court stated: "[SIome of the subdivisions refer to claimants and in-
sureds separately [CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (h) (10), (h) (11)1, and others only to in-
sureds [CAL INS. CODE § 790.03 (h) (6), (h) (7) ]. Thus, the subdivision by its own
terms extends certain of its protections to claimants, some to insureds, and others
to both claimants and insureds." See note 36 supra; Royal Globe v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
38. Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 888, 592 P.2d at 334, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 847.
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ties. Since no action was taken by the Legislature on the recom-
mendation, the court concluded that "it is a reasonable
implication that the committees' inaction represented a deliberate
decision that third party claimants were to enjoy the protection of
the bill."39
Finally, the court distinguished the Murphy v. Allstate40 deci-
sion. According to the court, the plaintiff in Murphy asserted that
she had a right to sue for the breach of a duty owed to the in-
sured. In Royal Globe, however, the plaintiff was not relying on a
duty owed to the insured, but rather on a statutory duty owed di-
rectly to the plaintiff.41
2. The Measure of Damages in a Third Party Action
The court in Royal Globe did not fully address the damages is-
sue with respect to the third party claimant's newly-created right
of action against the insurer who refuses to attempt a good faith
settlement.42 In viewing the issue along traditional lines of analy-
sis, it becomes apparent that the damages recoverable by the
third party claimant in such an action are not precisely the same
as those available to the insured himself.
In the traditional bad faith action, an insured may recover dam-
ages from the insurer for economic loss, emotional distress, attor-
ney's fees, exemplary damages, and the excess of a judgment
award beyond policy limits where applicable.43 Often, a third
39. Id. at 889, 592 P.2d at 335, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
40. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 414 (1976).
41. While the majority distinguished the Murphy holding, the dissent viewed
it as applicable to the facts in Royal Globe:
Only three years ago we unanimously held in Murphy v. Allstate ... that
the insurer's duty to settle runs to the insured and not to the injured
party, and that, accordingly, the latter may not recover from the insurer
for breach of that duty in the absence of a proper assignment of the in-
sured's cause of action (citations omitted).
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
850.
42. See note 2 supra.
43. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967). In Crisci a tenant in Mrs. Crisci's apartment fell through a wooden stair-
case. Although the tenant offered to settle the claim for $10,000, the policy limit,
the insurer refused. The tenant subsequently recovered a $101,000 judgment
award; Security Insurance Co. paid only the $10,000 due on the policy. Mrs. Crisci
then sued Security Insurance for a breach of the good faith duty in not accepting
the settlement offer. Her claim being that the bad faith act permitted the action to
go to trial which resulted in a verdict of $91,000 in excess of policy coverage. Mrs.
Crisci alleged that the situation caused her emotional distress and mental suffer-
party claimant is able to obtain an assignment 44 of the insured's
cause of action for the excess judgment award. Under Royal
Globe, an injured third party claimant may now recover all suf-
fered damages proximately caused by the insurer's breach of the
statutory duty. With respect to violations of California Insurance
Code Section 790.03 (h) (5),45 such awards might include elements
of economic loss, emotional pain and suffering, attorney's fees,
and exemplary damages.
The decision in Royal Globe should not, however, be read so as
to provide a third party claimant with a direct right of recovery
against the insurer for awards in excess of the insured defend-
ant's policy limits. As was pointed out in Murphy v. Allstate,46 a
decision which was not expressly overruled in Royal Globe, such
a right of recovery would not be consonant with traditional theo-
ries of damages and proximate causation.47
The Murphy court reasoned that since the third party plaintiff
was once willing to accept a sum within policy limits in full settle-
ment of his claim against the insured, he could not logically argue
that he incurred any loss or "damage" as a result of the insurer's
refusal to settle. Rather, the insurer's refusal to accept such a set-
tlement offer would effectively serve to benefit48 the plaintiff, to
the extent that his judgment exceeds the settlement sum for
which he was previously willing to execute a release, and a volun-
tary dismissal of his action against the insured.
Thus, absent further clarification of the court's ruling, it re-
mains necessary for the third party claimant to obtain an assign-
ment of the insured's cause of action against the insurer, in order
to seek recovery from the insurance company for an amount
awarded to the claimant in excess of the insured's limit of cover-
age.49 While such a result is clearly warranted under pure legal
ing as well as economic loss. The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's award of the $91,000 in excess as reimbursement in addition to $25,000 for
mental suffering.
44. However, no assignment is permitted with regard to the emotional distress
issue: Purcell v. Colonial Ins. Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 807, 97 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1971).
45. See note 2 supra.
46. 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1976).
47. The court in Murphy stated: "Because an insurer's refusal to accept a rea-
sonable settlement does not diminish the injured claimant's recovery, the policy of
compensating persons injured by negligent motorists is not frustrated." Murphy v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d at 944, 553 P.2d at 589, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
48. The court further stated: "Breach of the duty to settle will, if anything, al-
low the injured party to recover the amount of the offered settlement, perhaps an
additional sum to the extent of the policy limits, and sums in excess of those lim-
its from the negligent motorist." Id.
49. Since it is often difficult for a third party claimant to obtain an assignment
from a hostile or insolvent insured tortfeasor, many such claimants will still be left
with no way of recouping the full amount of actual loss incurred at the hands of
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analysis, as was applied in Murphy,50 the need for further clarifi-
cation or expansion of the third party's rights may be voiced in
the very near future by litigants, jurists and legislators alike.
3. The Unfair Practices Act Provides for a Private Remedy
In Royal Globe, the insurer contended that a third party could
not sue for a violation of the act, and that no private litigant could
bring an action to impose civil liability for a violation. 51 It was
maintained that only the Commissioner of Insurance could en-
force the act by issuing a cease and desist order to prevent future
violations.
The court rejected these contentions, holding that a private liti-
gant may bring an action to enforce the Unfair Practices Act. Ini-
tially, the court looked to Section 790.09 of the California
Insurance Code, which provides that a cease and desist order is-
sued by the commissioner does not absolve an insurer from "civil
liability or criminal penalty under the laws of this State arising
out of the methods, acts, or practices found unfair or deceptive." 52
This section was deemed to afford private litigants a cause of ac-
tion against insurers who engage in the unfair practices defined in
§ 790.03 (h).53 In support of this conclusion, the court cited three
prior decisions5 4 which reached a similar holding. In Greenberg v.
Equitable Life Assur. Society,55 for example, the court held that
§ 790.09 "contemplates a private suit to impose civil liability irre-
spective of governmental action against the insurer for violation
of a provision of the insurance code." 56
the insured, notwithstanding the noteworthy expansion of a third party's rights
under Royal Globe.
50. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
51. Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 884, 592 P.2d at 332, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 845.
52. CAL. INS. CODE § 790.09 (West 1972), provides:
No order to cease and desist issued under this article directed to any per-
son or subsequent administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the
same shall in any way relieve or absolve such person from any adminis-
trative action against the license or certificate of such person, civil liability
or criminal penalty under the laws of this state arising out of the methods,
acts or practices found unfair or deceptive.
53. See note 2 supra.
54. Homestead Supplies Inc. v. Executive Life Ins. Co., 81 Cal. App. 3d 978, 147
Cal. Rptr. 22 (1978); Shernoff v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 406, 118 Cal. Rptr.
680 (1975); Greenberg v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110 Cal. Rptr.
470 (1973).
55. 34 Cal. App. 3d 994, 110, Cal. Rptr. 470 (1973).
56. Id. at 1001, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 476.
4. An Isolated Incident of Bad Faith is Sufficient To Find a
Violation of the Act
The court in Royal Globe held that a single instance of bad
faith is sufficient to sustain a cause of action under the Unfair
Practices Act since the language "[K] owingly committing or per-
forming with such frequency as to indicate a general business
lractice . . ."57 is ambiguous and therefore subject to different in-
terpretations.5 8 The language suggests there are two alternative
methods by which violations of the act may be shown: (1) a viola-
tion occurs when the prohibited acts are knowingly committed on
a single occasion; or (2) if knowledge cannot be established, it will
be sufficient if the acts were performed with such frequency as to
indicate a general business practice.5 9
The issue of the sufficiency of a single instance of unfair con-
duct is further discussed in connection with the court's conclu-
sion that a private party is afforded a cause of action under the
act.60 Since the act affords the private remedy it is inconceivable
that the legislative intent was to require a private litigant to show
that the insurer had committed similar acts on prior occasions.
Therefore, it is more logical to assume that a private litigant need
only show that he, on the particular occasion in question, has
been victimized.
5. A Plaintiff May Not Sue the Insured and the Insurer in the
Same Lawsuit
The court, in Royal Globe, agreed with the defendant insurer's
contention that a plaintiff may not sue the insured and the in-
surer in the same lawsuit. California Evidence Code Section
115561 provides that evidence of insurance is not admissible to
prove negligence. Evidence of offers of settlement by the insurer
57. See note 2 supra.
58. Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 890, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 849.
59. This suggestion originates from the California Trial Lawyers Association
and has been proposed in 7 PACIFIC L.J. 484 (1976).
60. The court in Royal Globe stated:
Although the language of the statute is not clear, if the premise is ac-
cepted that a private party may bring an action for an insurer's violation
of subdivision (h) under the rationale of Greenberg and Shernoff, then a
single violation knowingly committed is a sufficient basis for such an ac-
tion.
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 891, 592 P.2d at 336, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
849.
61. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1185 (West 1966):
Liability Insurance. Evidence that a person was, at the time a harm was
suffered by another, insured wholly or partially against loss arising
from liability for that harm is inadmissible to prove negligence or
other wrongdoing.
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are also prejudicial for two reasons: (1) It may suggest to a jury
that the insured tortfeasor has admitted responsibility for the in-
jury suffered by the claimant,62 and (2) the jury, knowing that the
tortfeasor is insured, may be more apt to find for the plaintiff, be-
lieving the judgment will be paid by the insurance carrier.63
In addition, the court argues the damages suffered by a third
party for an insurer's violation of the Unfair Practices Act may
best be determined after the conclusion of the suit brought by the
injured party against the insured.64 The court reasoned that a
judgment award over and above the policy limits is often an indi-
cation of the damages suffered as a result of a bad faith act.65
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE NEW DUTy OF GOOD FArrH
1. Positive Implications
As the focus of the Royal Globe decision is on the newly found
duty of good faith due third parties, a discussion of the ramifica-
tions of such a duty, beginning with a discussion of the positive
results of the extended duty, is in order.
First, a third party claimant is now afforded a more equal bar-
gaining position when negotiating with the insurer.66 To attain
perspective, it it helpful to refer to the hypothetical illustration
discussed earlier.67 In the hypothetical, A, the injured pedestrian,
62. See Rising v. Veatch, 117 Cal. App. 404, 3 P.2d 1023 (1931); Citti v. Bava, 204
Cal. 136, 266 P. 954 (1928).
63. See Neumann v. Bishop, 59 Cal. App. 3d 451, 130 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1976); Rob-
erts v. Home Ins. Indemnity Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 313, 121 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1975).
64. Additionally, the court states:
Moreover, unless the trial against the insurer is postponed until the liabil-
ity of the insured is first determined, the defense of the insured may be
seriously hampered by discovery initiated by the injured claimant against
the insurer.
Royal Globe v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. 3d at 892, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at
850.
65. See Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
66. The same policy considerations exist with respect to insureds who are
claimants. Insureds have long been afforded a cause of action for the bad faith ac-
tions of insurers. See notes 6-7 supra. Compare Note Good Faith and Fair Deal-
ing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 25 HASTINGs L.J. 707
(1974):
A severe inequality of bargaining power between the insurer and the in-
sured is caused by many factors: the inability of most insureds to under-
stand the technical nature of the insurance contract, . . . and the
characteristic disparity in financial backing between the parties.
67. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
incurred substantial medical expenses as a result of the injuries
suffered in the accident.68 The failure on the part of C, the in-
surer, to effectuate a quick settlement once liability was reason-
ably established, may have served to pressure A into accepting a
lower settlement agreement, since the injured party was in imme-
diate need of funds.69 It is well to remember, that prior to Royal
Globe, A would have no direct recourse against C for such an in-
discretion. 70 Consequently, the superior bargaining position of
the insurer was further strengthened by the inability of a third
party to bring a cause of action for a bad faith settlement practice.
However, now that third parties have a cause of action, insurers
will be increasingly inclined to recognize a more equal counter-
part at the negotiating table.
Secondly, a party who has been injured twice may now recover
for both the primary tort of the insured and for the later breach of
the good faith duty by the insurer. It will be recalled that A was
victimized twice: initially, when struck by B's vehicle, and again
when C refused to settle the claim once liability became reason-
able clear. Without the extended liability, A's only cause of ac-
tion would have been for the primary tort of B.71
Finally, third party standing to enforce the Unfair Practices Act
may serve as a deterrent to insurers who engage in bad faith set-
tlement practices. As a result, it will frequently be more economi-
cal for insurers to settle quickly, rather than risk the possibility of
a lawsuit for unfair settlement practices. Paradoxically, this deci-
sion, while encouraging insurers to settle when liability is clear
and when the settlement demand is fair, may also serve to per-
suade insurers to settle when the settlement demand is unfair.72
68. See Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1970). The Fletcher case represents a situation where the insurer was in dire
financial straits after suffering a disability. The insurer refused to pay on the pol-
icy which directly caused the insured further and continuing deprivation.
69. See Franklin, Chanin, & Mark, Accidents, Money and the Law. A Study of
the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 30 (1961):
Extended delay may vitiate the relief finally obtained, especially if the
money is urgently needed . . . . Another, and related aspect of the delay
is its possible coercive effect that encourages victims to settle early for
less than the full value of their claim, rather than to wait indefinitely for
trial in the hope of getting a larger amount.
70. See e.g., Murphy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal. 3d 937, 553 P.2d 584, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 424 (1976).
71. See generally, notes 64-68 supra. The idea that if an insured claimant may
recover for an analogous, if not exact injury, then an injured third party claimant
should also be afforded relief.
72. The dissent in Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., described the majority's hold-
ing as putting insurers in a no-win situation: "if it (insurer) expects to avoid a
Crisci or Fletcher lawsuit, there is only one safe course: Pay all claims and inves-
tigate afterwards, assuming, of course, payment doesn't waive that right." 9 Cal.
3d 566, 592, 510 P.2d 1032, 1049, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 497 (1973).
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With these considerations in mind, the negative implications of
the extended duty of good faith should be examined.
2. Negative Implications
The possibility of unwarranted bad faith claims now hangs as
an ominous cloud over insurer-third party claimant settlement
conferences. The insurer will often find itself faced with a difficult
choice wherein it must either settle the claim for more than it is
fairly worth, or contest it and face the economic realities of litigat-
ing a bad faith action brought by the third party.7 3 Of course the
same choice exists when the claimant is the insured.74 In that sit-
uation, however, public policy dictates that a balancing test be
used which weighs the risk of unwarranted lawsuits against the
necessity of guaranteeing the insured an equitable bargaining po-
sition in negotiations with the insurer. The question then be-
comes one of whether the same balancing test should be used
with respect to third parties, or whether such a development
would strengthen the bargaining position of third parties to a dis-
proportionate extent.
It is one thing for an insurer to face the possibility of a suit for
bad faith acts from an insured who has paid premiums, is in priv-
ity of contract, and retains a fiduciary relationship with the in-
surer.75 It is quite another matter for an insurer to face a bad
faith claim from a non-party to the contract since a third party
stands in opposition to the insured, who is most likely being de-
fended by the insurer in the primary tort action. An obvious con-
flict of interest is created7 6 when the insurer must defend the
insured while at the same time protecting the interests of the
third party claimant.
The conflict is inherent in the adversary positions of the parties
subsequent to a tort by the insured. On one side of the settle-
73. See generally R. CONsTANrIN, SUE OR SErTLE 9-10 (1968):
In the industry's [insurance] view . .. many people go into the jury box
who are anxious to help the 'little guy' . . . . The trouble is that the com-
panies are not that rich, so that the juries are actually forcing up their
own insurance rates .... And there is no question that awards are, in
fact, increasing sharply.
74. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text supra.
75. See generally Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d
452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979); Rove Farms Resort Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J.
474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
76. See P. MAGARICK, EXCESS LUABIrrY: DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
INSURER 45-54 (1976). See also notes 6-7 supra.
ment conference table sits the insurer as a representative of the
insured defendant. The goal of the insured and the insurer is to
gain as low a settlement agreement as possible. On the other side
of the table sits the injured third party, who wishes to obtain a
high settlement on the claim. The result is that the insurer must
balance the interests of the insured with the injured party so as
not to breach the duty of good faith owed to both parties.
The conflict of interest difficulty is minimized since liability to
third parties is limited to situations where there is no reasonable
dispute as to the liability of the insured in the primary claim. Ar-
guably, this protects the interests of the insured when his liability
is in question, thereby preventing the insurer from delaying set-
tlement with the third party victim when liability on the primary
claim is reasonably clear.7 7
The problem of defining what is "reasonably clear,"78 still re-
mains and can be determined only on a case-by-case basis as a
question of fact. This is of small consolation to insurers who must
contest such facts before juries who are often sympathetic to in-
jured claimants.79
CONCLUSION
The insurance industry has reacted negatively to the Royal
Globe decision.80 Such a reaction is understandable and justifia-
ble in some respects because of the court's heavy reliance on the
ambiguous language of the act in determining that it was in-
tended to benefit third parties.8 1 As was discussed earlier, such
an interpretation creates an onerous burden for insurers. It is a
77. See notes 6-7 supra.
78. See note 72 supra.
79. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
80. Senator Beverly on March 1, 1979 introduced and sponsored Senate Bill
483 in the California State Senate; the bill represents the insurance industry's re-
sponse to the Royal Globe decision. Initially it sought to prevent any insured,
third party claimant, or any other individual other than the California Insurance
Commissioner from enforcing California Insurance Code Section 790.03. The
stated intent was to overrule the Royal Globe decision. As amended on Septem-
ber 4, 1979, the bill restated its intent as being to:
[M]odify the holding in Royal Globe Insurance Company v. Superior
Court insofar as it established a cause of action by a third party claimant
based upon a violation of subdivision (h) of Section 790.03. In enacting
this act, the Legislature finds that the duties owed a third party claimant
by an insurer are subject to conflicting duties owed by the insurer to the
insured. Therefore, in order to avoid conduct by insurers that might im-
pair the obligation of the insurer to represent the insured in an adversary
proceeding, the Legislature denies to third party claimants any cause of
action pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 790.03.
However, S.B. 483 has met with much opposition and as of this writing has not
made it out of committee.
81. See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
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burden that will likely be passed on to insureds through the im-
position of higher premiums.8 2
While the Royal Globe decision was to the chagrin of insurers,
it remains just one example of the recent trend in a number of
California cases8 3 to extend the liability of insurers for their prior
bad faith indiscretions. The courts thus determined that public
policy dictates that insurers be more responsive to the wishes and
demands of claimants, insureds and third parties alike.
MICHAEL TANCREDI
82. As insurers, liability extends, they must raise their premiums in order to
pay for the added costs inherent to increased liability.
83. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979). Egan is a case where the insurer refused disability payments to its in-
sured, Egan, without first investigating the validity of the claim. The court held
such a failure is in violation of the insurer's good faith duty; and further, allowed
punitive damages for the indiscretion.

